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 Assessing the Importance of Oligopsony Power in Agricultural Markets (Michael
 L. Cook, University of Missouri, presiding)
 Assessing the Importance of Oligopsony
 Power in Agricultural Markets
 Richard T. Rogers and Richard J. Sexton
 Oligopoly, competition among few sellers, is the
 cornerstone of industrial organization (IO). Con-
 versely, its sister concept, oligopsony, competi-
 tion among few buyers, is scarcely mentioned.
 For example, oligopsony is not discussed in the
 entire two volume Handbook of Industrial Orga-
 nization, and monopsony is mentioned only in the
 context of incentives to integrate vertically.
 Two reasons apparently account for IO econo-
 mists' lack of interest in buyer market power: (i)
 they don't think it's very important, and (ii) they
 don't believe it presents any unique modeling is-
 sues relative to seller market power. Scherer and
 Ross illustrate this first viewpoint, arguing that
 "average concentration on the buyers' side in
 manufacturing is undoubtedly lower than seller
 concentration" (p. 519). Tirole, in his masterful
 treatise on IO theory, illustrates the second, dis-
 patching monopsony power in one sentence:
 "Naturally the conclusions [regarding monopoly
 power] would also hold as well for monopsony
 power..." (p. 65).
 We argue that this dismissive treatment of
 buyer market power is not reasonable for econo-
 mists interested in agriculture and agricultural
 markets. The Scherer and Ross viewpoint may ap-
 ply when considering generic inputs such as la-
 bor, capital, and energy. Competition for these in-
 puts is apt to exceed competition for the outputs
 they produce because firms cross product market
 boundaries to compete for these inputs, and there
 is essentially no "branding" among input buyers
 to diminish price competition among them. More-
 over, these inputs are typically mobile, hence, in
 elastic supply to individual buyers, limiting the
 exercise of oligopsony power even in geographic
 settings where relatively few buyers prevail.
 This view of input markets does not apply,
 however, to first-handler markets for the raw agri-
 cultural commodities that are inputs into the pro-
 cessed or fresh-packed food products.' We iden-
 tify the following distinctive structural character-
 istics of these markets:
 Cl: The products are often bulky and/or per-
 ishable, causing shipping costs to be high, re-
 stricting the products' geographic mobility, and
 limiting farmers' access to only those buyers
 located close to the production site.
 C2: Processors' needs for agricultural products
 are highly specialized. Other inputs cannot nor-
 mally be substituted for a given farm product,
 nor can the given farm product substitute
 readily for agricultural product inputs in alter-
 native production processes.
 C3: Farmers are specialized to the supply of
 particular commodities through extensive in-
 vestments in sunk assets. These assets represent
 exit barriers for farmers and cause raw product
 supply to be inelastic.
 C4: Marketing cooperatives or bargaining
 associations, institutions of seller power, are
 present or potentially present in the market.
 Analyses of market power must begin with
 definitions of the relevant markets. Cl and C2 are
 crucial to defining input markets for agricultural
 products. Collectively, they assert that the rel-
 evant markets for raw agricultural products will
 typically be narrower with respect to both product
 class and geography than the markets for the fin-
 ished products they produce. Thus, Cl and C2
 contradict the general Scherer and Ross proposi-
 tion that buyer concentration will be less than Richard T. Rogers is associate professor in the Department of Re-
 source Economics at the University of Massachusetts, and Richard
 J. Sexton is professor and chair, Department of Agricultural Eco-
 nomics, University of California, Davis.
 The authors wish to thank Terri Sexton for helpful comments
 and Mingxia Zhang for expert research assistance.
 1 We focus on the first handler markets where oligopsony struc-
 tures are most pervasive and public policy issues concerning buyer
 market power are most acute, given ongoing concerns about low
 farm prices and incomes.
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 seller concentration. High buyer concentration in
 the relevant market coupled with inelastic sup-
 ply of the farm commodity (C3) jointly consti-
 tute compelling structural evidence of buyer
 market power.
 The prototype agricultural market character-
 istics also call into question Tirole's assessment
 that monopsony power can be analyzed readily
 using the tools of monopoly power analysis.
 For example, markets with costly product trans-
 port (Cl) are by definition spatial markets. Yet,
 the classic IO models ignore the spatial dimen-
 sion. Also, the institutions of countervailing
 power (C4) that are endemic to agriculture are
 largely absent from other sectors of the
 economy. In fact, without the protection afforded
 exclusively to farmer organizations through the
 Capper-Volstead Act, coalitions of sellers repre-
 sent a per se violation of the Sherman Act.
 These factors combine to generate the key
 premises of this paper. First, buyer market
 power is a significant issue in many first-han-
 dler markets. Second, understanding buyer mar-
 ket power in agriculture requires use of models
 that incorporate the unique structural character-
 istics of agricultural markets rather than models
 adapted routinely from the analysis of seller
 market power. We pursue these themes in the
 subsequent two sections of the paper.
 Evidence on Buyer Concentration in Food
 Markets
 Thirty-four years ago in a similar forum,
 Lanzillotti concluded from data assembled for
 fifty-one farm-related industries that "farmers,
 as sellers, have found themselves at the mercy
 of oligopsonies, collusion, and monopsony" (p.
 1240). Two great merger waves have since re-
 shaped the U.S. economy. Although trends in
 farm production include decreasing farm num-
 bers and increasing farm size, the imbalance
 between the number and size distribution of
 farmers and that of the firms they sell to has
 worsened since 1960. In this section we provide
 an updated view of structure in the food and to-
 bacco processing industries.
 Buyer concentration is difficult to assess be-
 cause there are no statistical series analogous to
 the abundant data available on seller concentra-
 tion. The Census of Manufacturing provides
 most of the public data available o study food
 pr cessing.2 The data for the fifty-three food
 and tobacco industries ident fied by four-digit
 SIC code in the 1987 Census show that m st in-
 dustries have experienced decreasing firm num-
 bers and increasing seller concentration over
 time. In t tal, the sector lost 11,000 firms, leav-
 ing just over 16,000 by 1987. Mor over, the
 sector's largest 100 firms accounted for two-
 thirds of its value added. Even without ad-
 justing for pro er market definitions, the
 data i dicate that sellers to the processing in-
 d stries now face fewer and more dominant
 firms.
 Most of the fifty-three food and tobacco
 industries contained in the Census do not de-
 fine relevant input markets because (a) input
 markets are often local or regional in geo-
 graphic scope (Cl), and (b) the four-digit in-
 dustry categories are too broad (C2). Table 1,
 part of a special Census tabulation, addresses
 this first problem for nine industries by mov-
 ing to the SIC five-digit product class data or
 even to more narrow classifications. The av-
 erage four-digit four-firm concentration ra-
 tion (CR4) is 37.8, and four of the nine in-
 dustries have CR4 ? 30. However, their five-
 and seven-digit classifications have an aver-
 age CR4 of 61.3, with twenty-four of the
 thirty-eight national product markets having
 CR4 2 50, a commonly used benchmark for
 separating markets into workable competi-
 tion and noncompetitive groups.
 Consider, for example, the meat and poultry in-
 dustries. Plants in these product categories are
 highly specialized and, even though the finished
 products may be good substitutes, the raw agri-
 cultural products are not substitutes into produc-
 tion. In these cases the five-digit product class
 data provide a basis for meaningful assessments
 of the input market structure. Similar conclusions
 hold for the flour and other grain mills and veg-
 etable oil mills categories. Table 1 documents
 that, generally, the number of firms and plants
 falls and CR4 rises when one moves from indus-
 try ata (four-digit) to product class data (five or
 more digits). In canned fruits, the relevant input
 markets are often so narrow that the seven-digit
 level of detail is necessary to attain the proper
 market definition. To illustrate, note that, al-
 though eighty-one firms canned fruits in 1987,
 only five and eleven processed cranberries and ol-
 ives, respectively. Thus, whereas canned fruits
 may represent a relevant output market class, it is
 far too broad for analysis of competition in the
 raw product markets because the vast majority of
 fruit processors do not compete, for example, for
 2 We focus on market structure in food processing in this sec-
 tion. Relevant market structure data on fresh market sales are prac-
 tically nonexistent. However, oligopsony power issues may be im-
 portant in this market due to increasing consolidation among the
 grocery retailers, the major buyers of food for fresh market sales.
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 Table 1. Selected SICs to Highlight Increased Concentration of Input Markets, 1987
 All Companies Top 100 Co-ops
 SIC Name Co Est VS CR4 Co-op Est VS Share
 2011 Meat packing plant products 1328 1434 41227 39 1 2 0.1
 20111 Beef, not canned or made into sausage 218 265 21684 58 0 0 0.0
 20112 Veal, not canned or made into sausage 52 53 379 64 0 0 0.0
 20113 Lamb and mutton, not canned or 38 51 380 73 0 0 0.0
 made into sausage
 20114 Pork, fresh and frozen 132 161 8,406 38 0 0 0.0
 2015 Poultry and egg processing 284 463 14,371 29 3 16 5.0
 20151 Young chickens 72 161 7,452 42 2 12 7.1
 20153 Turkeys, incl. frozen, whole and parts 41 57 1,645 38 1 3 2.5
 20159 Liquid, dried and frozen eggs 39 47 495 41 0 0 0.0
 2033 Canned fruits and vegetables 462 647 12,244 28 26 63 13.7
 20331 Canned fruits, except baby foods 81 120 2,085 49 9 25 38.6
 2033128 Canned cranberries and sauce 5 10 107 >96 1 6 (D)
 2033136 Canned olives, incl. stuffed 11 11 280 87 3 3 56.5
 2033190 Other canned fruits, 69 101 1,698 55 6 16 32.5
 excl. olives, cranberries
 20332 Canned vegetables, except hominy 99 214 2,298 42 3 10 8.8
 and mushrooms
 20333 Canned hominy and mushrooms 21 26 166 66 1 1 1.5
 20335 Canned vegetable juices 37 49 310 78 3 4 18.8
 20336 Catsup and other tomato sauces, pastes, etc. 94 148 3,024 55 1 6 5.0
 20338 Jams, jellies, and preserves 55 77 664 57 4 7 10.6
 2033A Canned fruit juices, nectars, and concentrates 95 133 2,344 48 9 18 14.4
 2033B Fresh fruit juices and nectars, single strength 188 295 951 35 14 25 16.3
 20866 Noncarbonated soft drinks, including 286 504 2,427 54 15 40 32.8
 fruit drinks
 2034 Dehydrated fruits, vegetables, and soups 107 132 2,079 37 3 4 14.2
 20343 Dried and dehydrated fruits and vegetables 52 82 1,544 41 3 4 19.1
 2034313 Raisins 11 13 334 80 1 1 (D)
 2034315 Prunes 10 24 265 88 1 1 (D)
 2034330 Dehydrated potatoes 8 11 173 90 0 0 0.0
 2035 Pickles, sauces, and salad dressings 344 382 4,479 40 3 3 1.8
 20352 Pickles and other pickled products 78 102 1,000 48 0 0 0.0
 2037 Frozen fruits and vegetables 194 258 6,254 30 7 13 8.4
 20371 Frozen fruits, juices, ades, drinks, cocktails 89 114 2,482 41 6 10 13.3
 20372 Frozen vegetables 86 147 3,645 42 3 9 5.4
 2037248 French-fried potatoes, incl. other potatoes 31 50 1,853 77 1 1 (D)
 2037290 Other frozen vegetables 69 110 1,792 27 2 8 (D)
 2041 Flour and other grain mill products 237 358 4,690 44 1 1 1.0
 20411 Wheat flour, except flour mixes 75 185 3,219 54 1 1 1.4
 20413 Corn mill products 55 98 561 59 0 0 0.0
 2076 Vegetable oil mill products, n.e.c. 20 23 490 70 3 3 4.3
 20761 Linseed oil 6 7 105 98 1 1 15.0
 20762 Vegetable oils 29 39 218 67 2 2 1.4
 2099 Food preparations, n.e.c. 1,510 1,658 10,671 23 7 12 0.6
 2099761 Dried, dehydrated potatoes, 8 11 (D) 99 0 0 0.0
 packed w/other ingred.
 2099771 Head rice packaged w/other ingredients 12 17 225 91 2 4 (D)
 2099921 Perishable prepared salads 84 86 359 46 1 1 (D)
 2099935 Vegetables, peeled or cut for the trade 22 25 78 61 0 0 0.0
 2099F Peanut butter 41 48 848 70 1 1 0.6
 2099G25 Honey, blended and churned 14 16 79 74 0 0 0.0
 Note: Co = number of companies; Est = number of establishments; VS = value of shipments in $millions. If the number of cooperatives
 was less than 5, the VS Share was estimated if possible, else (D); (D) = Census cannot disclose the value.
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 olives or for cranberries.
 The problem of using Census data to make
 inferences about local/regional markets is even
 more vexing. The national data will typically
 represent lower bounds on the relevant geo-
 graphic input market concentration.3 Two ex-
 amples illustrate the general problem. In 1987,
 twenty sweet corn canners and twenty-four fro-
 zen sweet corn processors operated with pro-
 duction scattered across much of the country,
 contributing collectively to a relatively uncon-
 centrated market for processed sweet corn.
 However, the relevant raw product input mar-
 kets may be highly concentrated, given the geo-
 graphic immobility of raw sweet corn (Jesse
 and Johnson). Similarly seventy-two broiler
 processors operated in 1987 with CR4 = 42.
 These firms are located predominantly in the
 "broiler belt" that stretches from the
 Midatlantic to eastern Texas. Shipping of re-
 frigerated and "super chilled" chickens has al-
 lowed the output market to continually enlarge
 in geographic scope, but the input markets re-
 main local, often a fifty-mile radius around a
 processor. The Census data are relatively impo-
 tent to overcome the problem of geographic
 market definition. Data available at the state
 level are limited to the four-digit level and
 give only establishment counts, employment,
 and sales data. In the more concentrated in-
 dustries even this information is withheld for
 confidentiality reasons.
 Cooperatives are directly relevant to market
 conduct in agriculture because they enable their
 members to integrate around oligopsony pro-
 cessors. They may also influence oligopsonists'
 behavior by acting as "yardsticks of competi-
 tion," an issue addressed in the next section.
 For the 100 largest marketing cooperatives,
 table 1 lists the number of co-ops and establish-
 ments in the product-class categories and their
 combined market shares. The co-op share is
 positively related to the importance of the agri-
 cultural input in the production process and
 negatively related to the industry's ratio of
 value added to shipments. Much of coopera-
 tives' involvement in food marketing is missed,
 however, when only food processing industries
 are examined because cooperatives have a ma-
 jor presence in the first-handler markets that
 are classified outside of food processing.
 Modeling Oligopsony in Agricultural
 Markets
 Not surprisingly, the data imi ations we have
 described have limited the scope for empirical
 study of oligopsony power in agriculture,
thereby placing a p emium on theoretical mod-
 eling a  a guide to understanding the dimen-
 sions and potential significance of the problem.
 In this section we develop a prototype model of
 oligopsony competition in agricultural markets,
 explore its implications, and discuss extensions
 of the basic model. Consistent with he prior
 discussion, the model incorporates th  impacts
 f (a) concentrated market structures, (b) costly
 product transporta ion, and (c) potential non-
 competitive conduct among processor/handlers.
 We illustrate how these market conditions inter-
 act to determine the farm-retail price spread.
 The basic model involves production and sale
 of a single product, r. Producers are assumed to
 be arrayed uniformly along a line of unit length.
 For the sake of mathematical tractability, an indi-
 vidu l farmer's function for supplying r is as-
 sum d to be linear: r = (1 / b)w, where w is the
 net price rece ved by the farmer.4 Under a system
 of free-on-board (FOB) pricing w = W - tU,
 where W is the processor's "mill" price, t is the
 shipping cost per unit distance, and U is the dis-
 tance from farm to processor.
 Processors are assumed to convert raw product
 into the processed product q according to the
 quasi-fixed production function q = min{R / X,
 (Z) }, where R is the aggregate raw product vol-
 ume procured by the processor, Z is a vector of
 processing inputs, and k = R / q is the fixed con-
 v rsion rate between raw and processed product.
 This function incorporates the notion of limited
 substitution between farm and processing inputs
 expressed in C2. Without loss of generality, we can
 set k = 1.0 through choice of measurement units.
 Firm market areas do not overlap under FOB
 pricing, and, thus, supply to a processor is
 found by integrating over his market radius, L
 L
 (1) R = 2JrdU
 0
 1 L
 = 2 - (W - tU)dU = - (2W - tL). b b
 0
 3 Differences between concentration in national markets and lo-
 cal input markets will be minimized if companies operate estab-
 lishments in each local market. Table 1 demonstrates, however,
 that this tends not to be the case. For the nine four-digit industries
 depicted in the table, the ratio of establishments to companies is
 only 1.20.
 4 This function derives from a Cobb-Douglas technology of the
 form r = AXo05sy5, where X and Y are inputs and A is a constant. We
 consider the short-run case where Y is fixed at the level Y = Y".
 Then, from producer profit maximization it follows that (1 / b) =
 A2Y" I2v, where v is the price of the variable input X.
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 The cost function associated with the produc-
 tion function for q is c(R) = W(R)R + m(R) + f,
 where R = q is the total volume processed,
 W(R) is, from (1), the inverse supply function
 facing the processor, m(R) is the cost associated
 with the processing inputs Z, and f > 0 repre-
 sents a fixed cost. It will be convenient to as-
 sume processors operate with constant marginal
 costs and, hence, that m(R) = mR. Furthermore,
 to focus on issues of oligopsony power, we as-
 sume that processors are perfect competitors in
 the sale of q and take output price P as given.
 We define a price level P = Po and scale money
 units so that Po - m = 1.0. A processor's profit
 function is thus
 (2) 7r(R) = (1 - W)R(W) -f.
 The first-order condition for maximizing (2)
 can be expressed as follows (see Sexton):
 I - W 1
 (3) Q( - W n
 dR W aR W R L dL W
 = - -+
 dW R aW R L R dW L
 Equation (3) expresses the appealing notion
 that the spatial competitor must consider both
 the direct effect of its price change on producer
 supply, aR / 3W, and the indirect effect on its
 market area based on rivals' reactions, aR /
 aL(dL / dW). The relative farm-retail price
 spread, 0, provides a convenient metric of per-
 formance in the raw product market. Its lower
 bound is zero under competitive behavior and
 for the model considered here its upper bound
 under pure monopsony is 1.0. Thus, (F(e [0, 1].
 We model a short-run industry equilibrium
 where the number, n, of processors in the mar-
 ket area is given. Moreover, we assume that the
 processors are symmetric and are arrayed equi-
 distantly along the unit interval.5 Distance be-
 ween processors is then 1 / n. Given this speci-
 fication, the equation defining the market
 boundary between a representative processor
 and its rival is the condition of equality of net
 prices W - tL = W* - t[(1 / n) - L], where W* is
 the mill price of an adjacent rival. Solving for L
 and differentiating with respect to W obtains
 (4) L W - W* + - -, n) 2t
 dL dW* 1 a
 =1 - - - =
 dW (I dW) 2t 2t
 Here a = 1 - (dW* / dW) specifies producer con-
 duct. Under competitive Bertrand/Hotelling be-
 havior dW* / dW = 0 and a = 1, whereas under
 collusive/Loschian behavior dW* / dW = 1 and a
 = 0. Thus, it is convenient to consider a to lie in
 the unit interval, a E [0, 1], with higher values of
 a denoting increasingly less competitive conduct.
 The index a may be interpreted in "conjectural
 variations" parlance, but, more generically, it can
 be treated simply as an index of processor con-
 duct.
 Given the specification for dL / dW in (4), the
 remaining steps in formulating the relative price
 s read in (3) involve specifications for the partial
 derivatives, JR / JW and JR / aL. The first expres-
 sio  is obtained simply by differentiating the sup-
 ply function (1): aR / aW = 2L / b, and the second
 expression is obtained by noting that the gain in
 supply f om expanding market area is simply the
 amounts supplied by th  farmers at either border:
 JR / JL = (2 / b)(W - tL). Setting L = 1 / 2n and
 substituting these v rious expressions into (3)
 yields a reduc d-form expression for the relative
 farm-retail price spread as a function of the mar-
 ket concentration measured by n 2 1, processor
 conduct measured by a [0, 1], and the spatial
 dimen ion of the market measur d in terms of t
 1-w
 (5) ((t, n, a) =
 2na - ta - 4 + 2nj(a2 /t2)(1 - t / n)) + (1/2n)(a2 - 4a + 16)]
 2na + t[a - 4 + 2nV((a2 / t2)(1 - t / n)) + (1 / 2n)(a2 - 4c + 16)]
 Because the expression for (F in (5) is rather
 complex, it is convenient to simulate the
 behavior of the price spread for alternative
 values of t, n, and Ca. To determine reasonable
 bounds for t, consider that total farm-to-
 processor shipping costs, tU, in the range of
 5 Processors' locations, once chosen, are fixed. Equal separation
 among processors minimizes the total cost of transporting a given vol-
 ume of raw product. We do not invoke a long-run equilibrium as-
 sumption of zero profit and treat n as endogenous (e.g., Beckman and
 Capozza and Van Order) for two reasons. First, profits are driven to
 zero by free entry, which most analysts agree does not hold generally
 in food processing. Second, treating n as exogenous enables us to il-
 lustrate how concentrated market structures interact with firm conduct
 and spatial market parameters to influence the farm-retail price spread.
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 (a) (b)
 Loschian/Collusive Behavior (a = 0) Hotelling/Bertrand Behavior (a = 1)
 1.0 0.6
 0.5
 0.9
 0.4
 o.8 0.3
 0.2
 0.7
 0.1
 0.6., 0.0
 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 0 2.5 3.0 35 4.0 45 5.0 0.0 05 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3,5 4.0 4,5 5,0
 Transportation cost Transportation cost
 (c) (d)
 Cournot Behavior Cooperative competition (n = 3)
 0.6 1.0
 0.3
 0.50.
 0.0
 03
 0.3 0.2
 0.1
 02,
 0.6 1.1 1.6 2.1 2.6
 0.0 0.5 1.0 15 2,0 25 3.0 3.5 4,0 4.5 5.0 Transportation cost
 Transportation cost BertranLia aBe= 14
 LEGEND ++4+ n = 1 4n 2 V n= 3 Ew n = 5 *--* n = 1 LoschianCo-op Lochin(al0
 Figure 1. Farm-retail price spreads for alternative forms of market behavior
 25% of raw product value are not uncommon
 (Durham and Sexton). Using the competitive
 mill price W = 1.0, this benchmark yields a
 maximum t = t* based on the formula t* / 2n =
 0.25W = 0.25, or t*(n) = 0.5n, where U = 1 / 2n
 defines the longest haul, given n.
 Figures la-Ic summarize the results for val-
 ues of t e [0, t*] (e.g., t* = 1.0 implies haulage
 costs of 0.25 for the boundary producer, given
 n = 2) and n = 1, 2, 3, 5, 10. Figure la repre-
 sents the case of Loschian or collusive behavior
 among processors, where (x = 0 and, hence dL /
 dW = 0. In this case each firm acts as a
 monopsonist within its market area. Higher trans-
 portation costs reduce the price spread under
 Loschian competition because they diminish
 farmers' net price, W- tU, causing supply facing
the processor to become more elastic and proces-
 sors to react by raising W. Conversely, increasing
 the number of buyers n increases the relative mar-
 gin because more buyers cause smaller market
 areas for each buyer, thereby mitigating the ef-
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 fect transportation costs have in increasing pro-
 cessor prices.6
 Figure lb depicts behavior under Bertrand/
 Hotelling competition, dW* / dW = 0 and a = 1.
 In nonspatial models this behavior induces the
 competitive market outcome as reflected in 1(t
 = 0) = 0 for all n. However, costly transporta-
 tion and small n interact to produce rather large
 relative price spreads even under this form of
 aggressive processor competition.7
 Figure c depicts D under Cournot behavior,
 generally considered to be an appealing alterna-
 tive to the extremes of Bertrand or Collusive
 behavior. In the Cournot case, the price spread
 ranges from a low of F(t = 0) = 1/3 for all n to
 D > 0.5 for small numbers of sellers and high
 relative transportation costs.
 Finally, we extend the basic model to include
 marketing cooperatives operating in conjunc-
 tion with ordinary for-profit processors. As
 table 1 illustrates, this situation is common.
 Two market performance implications follow.
 First, members of the cooperative do not face
 oligopsony pricing, as the cooperative seeks to
 maximize member welfare. Second, as noted by
 Sexton, the presence of a cooperative may im-
 prove market performance by competing rivals.
 From (4) the rational conjecture of a
 cooperative's price response to a noncoopera-
 tive rival's price increase, dW c / dW, is negative
 whenever the cooperative faces an upward
 sloping net average revenue product curve for
 its members' production. Given f > 0, this con-
 dition prevails in the present model. Thus from
 (4), a > 1 when facing a cooperative rival, and
 a cooperative stimulates even more competitive
 market conduct than Bertrand competitors.8
 Figure id illustrates how a cooperative pres-
 ence improves market performance of for-profit
 rivals for the model developed in this section.
 The figure is based on n = 3, and evaluates the
 equilibrium price spread generated by a repre-
 sentative firm who competes either with two
 for-profit rivals (either Loschian or Bertrand
 competitors) versus when one of the rivals is a
 cooperative. The cooperative's impact on per-
 formance is especially significant when it re-
 places a Loschian competitor and when trans-
 portation costs are relatively low. High trans-
 portation costs vitiate the competitive impact of
 even a cooperative rival.
 Conclusions
 This paper has argued that markets for raw ag-
 icultural products are likely to be structural
 olig psonies. Concentration in the these first-
 handler markets will often exceed concentra-
 tion in the affiliated finished product markets.
 We developed a simple theoretical model to il-
 lustrate how high buyer concentration, costly
 product transport, and noncompetitive buyer
 conduct may interact to produce large farm-re-
 tail price spreads.
 The analysis suggests that monopsony/oli-
 gopsony issues deserve strong consideration in
 food industry policy debates, but to date this
 has not been the situation. Even in the meat in-
 dustry where consolidation and increased con-
 centration issues have been most dramatic, the
 courts did not address input market concerns
 (Purc ll). Absent public intervention to pro-
 mote competition in raw product markets, farm-
 ers' main opportunities to foster competitive
 behavior in their selling markets are through
 developing means of countervailing power.
 Given the size disparities between farmers and
 their buyers, countervailing power must often
 be attained jointly through bargaining associa-
 tions or marketing cooperatives. The potency of
 even this tool may be diminished, however, by
 powerful buyers who, as Innes and Sexton have
 shown, may be able to "divide-and-conquer"
 farmers through discriminatory practices.
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